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ABSTRACT
Voting plays a central role in bringing crowd wisdom to collec-
tive decision making, meanwhile data privacy has been a common
ethical/legal issue in eliciting preferences from individuals. This
work studies the problem of aggregating individual’s voting data
under the local differential privacy setting, where usefulness and
soundness of the aggregated scores are of major concern. One naive
approach to the problem is adding Laplace random noises, how-
ever, it makes aggregated scores extremely fragile to new types
of strategic behaviors tailored to the local privacy setting: data
amplification attack and view disguise attack. The data amplifica-
tion attack means an attacker’s manipulation power is amplified
by the privacy-preserving procedure when contributing a fraud
vote. The view disguise attack happens when an attacker could
disguise malicious data as valid private views to manipulate the
voting result.
In this work, after theoretically quantifying the estimation error
bound and the manipulating risk bound of the Laplace mechanism,
we propose two mechanisms improving the usefulness and sound-
ness simultaneously: the weighted sampling mechanism and the
additive mechanism. The former one interprets the score vector as
probabilistic data. Compared to the Laplace mechanism for Borda
voting rule with d candidates, it reduces the mean squared error
bound by half and lowers the maximummagnitude risk bound from
+∞ to O( d3nϵ ). The latter one randomly outputs a subset of candi-
dates according to their total scores. Its mean squared error bound
is optimized from O( d5nϵ 2 ) to O( d
4
nϵ 2 ), and its maximum magnitude
risk bound is reduced to O( d2nϵ ). Experimental results validate that
our proposed approaches averagely reduce estimation error by 50%
and are more robust to adversarial attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections.
KEYWORDS
privacy, vote, security, aggregation, election
1 INTRODUCTION
Collective decision making is widely adopted by governing orga-
nizations and commercial service providers, which benefits from
the wisdom of crowd via aggregating individual preferences. For
example, during an election for social choice, a profile of ranking
data from voters is summarized to determine the final preference
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ordering over several options; when online service providers are
choosing the next movement, millions of users’ preference data
are aggregated to measure relative popularity between alternative
treatments.
The mapping frommany individual preferences to a single result-
ing ordering is called the voting rule. An intuitive and fundamental
class of voting rule is positional voting rule, the general idea of
which is assigning each candidate a score according to its posi-
tion/rank in each voter’s preference. Examples of positional voting
rule include the Borda counts [7], plurality voting and Nauru voting
[59]. Specifically in Borda voting, the i-th candidate in a vote scores
d − i points, where d is the number of options or candidates. If 4
voters’ preferences over 5 candidates are:
voter 1 : A3 A2 A1 A4 A5; voter 2 : A2 A3 A5 A4 A1;
voter 3 : A5 A2 A3 A4 A1; voter 4 : A1 A2 A5 A3 A4,
following the rule of Borda counts, the candidateA3 scores 10 points,
and the candidate A2 wins the voting with highest 13 points.
Privacy is a basic requirement in secured voting systems [34], as
providing secrecy of votes could avoid leaking personal preferences
and help to elicit honest responses, especially when voting on
sensitive topics. Privacy threats not only come from parties outside
the voting system, but also come from the administrator, the counter
or other voters whomight want to infer certain voters’ votes. Secure
multi-party computation [11] alleviates these problems by securely
aggregating scores, but is still fragile to collusion between the
counter and other voters, and may have efficiency issues for large-
scale online voting systems involving millions of voters. Differential
privacy [22] could also be employed for privacy preserving voting,
which ensures distinguishability of results no matter any single
vote presents or not in the voting profile. However, it relies on the
existence of a trustful data curator/counter for all voters.
Another paradigm to privacy preserving voting is local differ-
ential privacy, which sanitizes the vote locally and independently
on the voter’s side, and ensures up to exp(ϵ) distinguishability on
outputting probabilities no matter what the true vote a voter holds.
Local privacy has the advantages of being information-theoretically
rigid, computationally efficient and operationally flexible. The voter
has full controllability during the privacy preserving procedure
without the trust of any parties, the counter/administrator is also
tolerable to voters’ unsynchronized opt-out, withdrawal and modi-
fication actions on votes. These advantages make local differential
privacy the best fit for recently enacted General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR [67]) in the European Union, which emphasizes
data owner’s controllability on contribution, storage, analysis and
transfer of their data.
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A straight-forward way to realize local differential privacy for
voting data is adding Laplace random noises. After representing
votes in a score form as in Table 1, Laplace noises of scale ϵ∆ are
independently added to each score in a vote, here the ϵ is privacy
level and the ∆ is the maximum absolute difference between any
two scored votes. If d is odd, we have ∆ = d2−12 for Borda voting.
For example, the scored vote v(1) possibly becomes:
v˜(1) = [26.6, −45.2, 6.3, −7.3, −1.5],
after adding Laplace noises of scale 1.012 . In order to reach the cri-
terion of local differential privacy, the (unbiased) private view v˜
might far deviate from the true vote v . The expected deviation of
the private view here is E[|v˜ −v |22] = 2d∆
2
ϵ 2 . This formula indicates
preserving privacy comes at the cost of data usefulness, improving
which is the central focus in the current local privacy literature
(e.g., in [9, 20, 41, 42]).
Table 1: An example of 4 scored votes on 5 candidates in
Borda voting.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
v(1) 2 3 4 1 0
v(2) 0 4 3 1 2
v(3) 0 3 2 1 4
v(4) 4 3 1 0 2
total score 6 13 10 3 8
average score 1.5 3.25 2.5 0.75 2.0
1.1 Privacy Induced Attacks
For voting or other data aggregation systems whose results have
critical consequences, the soundness of the system against to strate-
gic participants is also fundamental. We observe that local privacy
preservation comes at the cost of also the soundness. The power of
adversarial attacks (e.g., vote fraud) might be amplified by the pri-
vacy preserving procedure, disguising as private views also makes
adversaries much easier to manipulate the voting result.
Data amplification attack. In the case that an adversary could
contribute fraud data but is unable to skip the privacy preserving
procedure, the effects that the fraud data can have on the result
might be amplified due to the intrinsic randomness nature of privacy
preservation. A more rigid level of privacy preservation means the
private view will have more randomness, and hence have more
(maximum or expected) magnitude. Take the Laplace approach as
an example, in the non-private setting (e.g., ϵ = +∞), the magnitude
of one vote is |v | = ∑j ∈[1,d ](d− j) = d (d−1)2 = 10, but the maximum
magnitude of a private view v˜ becomes infinite as Laplace random
noises are unbounded. The expected magnitude of the private view
is a function of privacy level as follows:
E[|v˜ |] = ∆
ϵ
· e
ϵ/∆ − e(1−d )ϵ/∆
eϵ/∆ − 1 +
d(d − 1)
2 .
Although local differential privacy ensures indistinguishability on
outputs of any possible votes, hence the constructive power of one
vote on the voting result is diminished, but its deconstructive power
is amplified.
View disguise attack. In the case that an adversary has direct
control on the private view sent to the aggregator, the adversary
will be able to disguise a malicious private view as an ordinary (ran-
domized) one, and thus make constructive/deconstructive changes
to the aggregation result. The domain of private views is broader
than the true data and grows with the level of privacy, hence an
adversary’s constructive/deconstructive power becomes larger. For
example, in the non-private setting, the domain of a scored vote is
bounded by [0,d − 1]d , while in the Laplace approach, the domain
of the private view is scaled to [−∞,+∞]d . Even though we can
filter out private views that are extremely unlikely to be observed,
the filtered domain [−Θ˜( 1ϵ ),+Θ˜( 1ϵ )] also grows with the level of
privacy preservation (see Section 4.3 for detail). Compared to se-
lecting a value from the domain of scored votes in the non-private
setting, an adversary is easier to manipulate the election result by
selecting a value from the (filtered) domain of private views.
1.2 Our Contributions
As a remedy to above issues in the naive approach to local differ-
ential private vote aggregation, this work aims to develop novel
mechanisms improving the usefulness and soundness. The main
content and contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
I. We identify soundness issues due to privacy preservation in
local private data aggregation systems and categorize them
as data amplification/view disguise attack based on an adver-
sary’s controllability over the privacy preserving procedure.
The data amplification attack captures an adversary’s decon-
structive power on the aggregation result by contributing
fraudulent data. The view disguise attack captures an adver-
sary’s constructive/deconstructive power on the aggregation
result by directly disguising private views. Formal quantified
metrics are defined (in Section 3) to measure the power of
adversarial attacks and the soundness of local private voting
systems.
II. We present thorough analyses of Laplace mechanism for lo-
cal private vote aggregation (in Section 4, partially in former
paragraphs), including sensitivity bounds of general posi-
tional voting rules, error bounds of estimated votes, and risk
bounds under strategic attacks.
III. A novel alternative to the Laplace approach: the weighted
sampling mechanism, is proposed for general positional vot-
ing rules (in Section 5). The mechanism samples an option
with a probability mass proportional to its score and then
applies well-studied local private methods on the categorical
option. For Borda counts, this mechanism reduces estimation
error bound from ∼ d52nϵ 2 to ∼ d
5
4nϵ 2 , and reduces the maxi-
mummanipulation risk bound from +∞ toO( d3nϵ ), compared
to the Laplace mechanism.
IV. Given that the weighted sampling mechanism works unsatis-
factorily in the high privacy regime, we further propose the
additive mechanism (in Section 6), which samples a subset
of candidates according to the summation of their scores.
The sampling problem underlying the mechanism is a strict
case of the weighted random sampling problem [28], we
provide a recursive algorithm as a solution. The additive
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mechanism has estimation error bound of O( d4nϵ 2 ), and ex-
pected/maximum manipulation risk bounds both at O( d2nϵ ).
V. We discuss the interaction/trade-off between usefulness,
soundness, truthfulness and indistinguishability in local pri-
vate data aggregation (in Section 7). Quantified relation be-
tween estimation error bound and manipulation risk bound
is built, which shows optimizing usefulness usually benefits
soundness.
VI. Experiments on extensive voting scenarios are conducted
(i.e., in Section 8) to validate the usefulness and soundness of
proposed mechanisms. Results demonstrate that estimation
errors decrease by 1/2 and manipulation risks are also signif-
icantly reduced, when compared to the existing approaches.
2 RELATEDWORK
Security requirements in voting systems cover many aspects, such
as privacy, verifiability and soundness. Here we review some repre-
sentative works on the privacy/anonymity/soundness in the area
of electronic voting and computational social choice, then retro-
spect recent works on privacy preserving data analyses within the
differential privacy framework.
2.1 Security in Voting Systems
2.1.1 Privacy/Anonymity. Since the seminal work of Chaum [12],
plenty of cryptographic schemes have contributed to keeping voters
or (and) votes secret in electronic voting systems. Schemes based
on homomorphic encryption operate on encrypted votes to com-
pute the sum/average of votes without knowing plain-text of votes
(e.g., ElGamal encryption in [38, 53], Paillier encryption in [60, 71],
and [39, 56]), hence keeps votes private from the vote counter
or adversaries. Further combining cryptographic techniques with
anonymous channels (e.g, the mixnet in [1, 8, 46, 55]) that randomly
shuffle a bundle of messages from voters, votes (or ciphertexts) are
then unlinkable to source voters. Having one single vote counter
in a voting system is intolerant to failures or attacks, several works
hence then multiple authorities secret sharing on decryption key
[18] to improve robustness of the system. In case of multiple author-
ities, the secrecy of every vote could be improved by decomposing
them into several parts, each part is then sent to some authorities
(e.g, in [5, 14, 17]). Consequently, corrupted authorities less than a
threshold number are unable to derive complete information of a
vote.
Another line of works that could be employed for privacy pre-
serving voting systems is data perturbation, which uses techniques
of generalization (e.g., k-anonymity [62] in [10, 74]) and random-
ization (e.g., Gaussian noise adding [23], randomized response [70]
and differential privacy [22]) to hide the exact values of each vote
and the voting result. Compared to cryptographic techniques pro-
vide computational secrecy and anonymity of votes/voters, data
perturbation approaches are usually much more efficient for imple-
mentations. Among them, classic privacy notions and techniques
like k-anonymity and Gaussian noise adding have shown to be
risky for adversaries with prior knowledge [43, 48, 50].
2.1.2 Soundness. Consider strategic behaviors in voting systems
like vote manipulation, fraud and bribery, many works have con-
tributed to finding counter-measures for various voting rules. One
approach is putting restrictions on voters’ preference. Specifically,
works of [21, 29, 30, 52] show that voting with single peak prefer-
ence and quasilinear preference is truthful and non-manipulatable.
Another approach is ensuring computational hardness of find-
ing constructive/deconstructive manipulation strategies (e.g., in
[3, 15, 32, 57]). However, for positional voting rules considered in
this work, there exist simple greedy algorithms finding strategic
votes that manipulate the result in polynomial time [2]. There are
also some works propose to introduce randomness to the voting
process (e.g., sampling voter at random) for mitigating manipu-
lation attacks, but the usefulness of the voting result is severely
harmed [35]. As a comparison, this work introduces randomness
to votes for the purpose of privacy preserving and demonstrates
that local differential privacy helps to defend against vote manipu-
lation but makes the voting result more vulnerable to fraudulent
votes, when compared to non-private settings (see Section 7.2 for
discussion).
2.2 Differential Privacy
2.2.1 Differential Private Data Analyses. As the state-of-the-art
data perturbation notion and technique for databases, differen-
tial privacy [22] in the centralized setting ensures information-
theoretical privacy. For numerical outputs such as counts and his-
togram, injecting Laplace random noises [24] is the most popular
mechanism (e.g., in [37, 47, 72]). For categorical outputs such as
choosing a winning candidate, exponential mechanism [51] satis-
fies differential privacy by randomly selecting a category with a
probability according to its utility loss (e.g., in [6, 61]). For more
complex data analyses and mining tasks (e.g, classification learning,
clustering), a sequence combination of Laplace and exponential
mechanism needs to be used (e.g., in [13, 49]).
Despite the functionality of data privacy preservation, differen-
tial privacy also has a close relation to stability [25, 40], and could
avoid false discovery in scientific experiments [26, 27, 36]. Since
the outputting results are almost indistinguishable when any sin-
gle individual’s data present or not, the exponential mechanism is
shown to be sound to data manipulation and data fraud [51]. How-
ever, due to the discrepancy in soundness performance between
unbounded and bounded differential privacy [45], local differential
private data aggregation is fragile to data fraud attacks (see Section
7.2 for further discussion).
2.2.2 Local Private Data Aggregation. When defining neighboring
datasets as any pairs of values individuals may hold, differential
privacy is preserved in the local setting [20] (LDP). Because of the
solidness of privacy guarantee and flexibility for deployment, LDP
has gained massive attention from both industry and academy. Gi-
ant internet service providers are collecting user preference (e.g.,
browser’s homepage) and usage records (e.g., typed words) from
their users in the local differential privacy manner, such as Google
[31, 33], Apple [64, 65], and Microsoft [19]. Research works have
explored local private data analyses and modeling tasks on various
kinds of data, such as distribution estimation on categorical data
[4, 41] and set-valued data [58, 69], joint distribution estimation and
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Table 2: List of notations.
Notation Description
A The set of candidates/options
d The number of candidates/options
n The number of voters/participants
w A voting rule’s score vector
v(i) A scored vote of voter i that is a permutation of w
Dv The set of possible permutations of w
v˜(i) An estimator (private view) of the scored vote v(i)
Dv˜ The set of all possible private views
θ Average scores of candidates.
θ˜ Estimator of average scores.
ϵ The privacy budget
frequent itemset mining on multidimensional data [16, 73], mean
estimation on numerical data [20]. There are also theoretical con-
tributions to give lower error bounds of local private data analyses
(e.g., in [20, 42, 66]).
Existing works on local differential privacy focus mostly on the
usefulness aspect, some of which may also consider computational
and communicational efficiency. This work calls for attention to
the soundness aspect in local private data analyses, which is se-
vere in real-world systems (e.g., the RAPPOR of Google [31] and
iOS/macOS data collection of Apple [63]) where there are malicious
and adversarial clients.
It’s worth noting that for some specific voting rules, such as
plurality/k-approval voting (see Section 3), the scored vote can be
directly seen as categorical/set-valued data and then processed with
existing approaches (e.g., in [41, 58, 69]). This work intends to deal
with positional voting with the arbitrary design of score vector. The
local private vote aggregation problem can also be cast as the multi-
dimensional mean estimation problem, one approach to which is
adding Laplace noises to every score (see detail in Section 4), an-
other is first randomly sampling one (data-independent) candidate
without knowing the vote and then adding Laplace noises to the
candidate’s points (e.g., in [54, 68]). However, the latter approach
assumes independence of each vote and can’t obtain an unbiased
estimator of a whole vote, hence is beyond discussions of this work.
3 PRELIMINARIES
This section formally introduces definitions of positional voting,
local differential privacy and the model of local private vote aggre-
gation. Usefulness and robustness metrics are also defined in this
section. We summarize notations throughout this work in Table 2.
3.1 Positional Voting
A vote π is a linear ordering over all candidates A =
{A1,A2, ...,Ad }, where the relation ≻ between two candidates is
the preference of a voter. In positional voting, the j-th candidate πj
in a vote is assigned by a score ofw j . For reasonable positional vot-
ing rules, the score vector w = {w1,w2, ...,wd } is non-increasing,
which means w j ≥ w j+1. Examples of score vector for popular
positional voting rules with 5 candidates are as follows:
vote
...
LDP view
[ 2   3   4   1   0 ]
[ 0   4   3   1   2 ]
[ 0   3   2   1   4 ]
[ 4   3   1   0   2 ]
[ 1.1  -0.2  6.4  1.5   0.2 ]
[ -1.3  2.9  1.8  0.2   1.3 ]
[ -0.7  1.6  3.8  1.5   1.8 ]
[ 4.6  0.6  1.2  -0.6   0.1 ]
counter
Figure 1: Demonstration of vote aggregation with ϵ-LDP.
• Borda: {4, 3, 2, 1, 0};
• Nauru: {1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5};
• Plurality: {1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
• Anti-plurality: {1, 1, 1, 1, 0};
• k-Approval: {1, 1, 0, 0, 0} (k = 2).
For the simplicity of reference, we rewrite the voter i’s vote π (i)
as numerical scores for each candidate: v(i) = [v(i)1 ,v
(i)
2 , ...,v
(i)
d ],
where v(i)j is the score of candidate Aj .
3.2 Local Differential Privacy
The local differential private notion ensures bounded distinguisha-
bility in outputs for any two possible inputs, hence blocks adver-
saries from inferring much information from outputs. Let Dπ de-
note the domain of votes, which represents all possible orderings
over candidates A, let M denote a randomized mechanism, and
DM denote the output domain of the mechanism, Definition 3.1
formally defines local differential privacy.
Definition 3.1 (ϵ-LDP). A randomized mechanism M satisfies
local ϵ-differential privacy iff for any possible vote pair π ,π ′ ∈ Dπ ,
and any possible output t ∈ DM ,
P[M(π ) = t] ≤ exp(ϵ) · P[DM (π ′) = t].
Here the parameter ϵ is called the privacy budget, which con-
trols the level of privacy preservation. Practical values for ϵ range
between [0.01, 3.0].
3.3 Aggregation Model
Consider n voters N = {1, 2, ...,n}, the voter i holds a vote π (i)
(or a scored vote v(i)), for the purpose of privacy preservation, the
voter sanitizes π (i) to get the private view v˜(i) by running a ϵ-LDP
mechanism M locally and independently. The private view v˜(i)
from a meaningful mechanism is an estimator of the true scored
vote v(i), hence the counter in the voting system could estimate
the actual average scores θ = 1n
∑
v(i) as:
θ˜ =
1
n
∑
v˜(i). (1)
Figure 1 demonstrates the above procedures of local private vote
aggregation. In adversarial environments, the counter may filter
out some potential malicious private views.
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3.4 Performance Metrics
Usefulness metrics. Estimators of average scores θ˜ given
by different mechanisms have varied accuracy, here we use three
usefulness metrics:
• mean squared error: errMSE = E[|θ˜ − θ |22];
• total variation error: errTVE = E[|θ˜ − θ |1];
• maximum absolute error: errMAE = E[maxj ∈[1,d ] |θ˜ j − θ j |].
Since average scores eventually determine one winning can-
didate, let jmax = argmaxj ∈[1,d ] θ j denote the candidate’s in-
dex with maximum average score in true average scores θ , and
j˜max = argmaxj ∈[1,d ] θ˜ j denote the winning candidate’s index in
the estimated average scores θ˜ , we define following metrics:
• accuracy of winner: accuracyAOW = E[j˜max = jmax ];
• loss of winner: errLOW = E[θ jmax − θ j˜max ].
Soundness metrics. To measure an adversary’s deconstructive
power of data amplification attack by contributing one extra vote
v , we use following metrics:
• maximum magnitude: riskMM = maxv˜ ∈Dv˜ |v˜ |1n ;
• expected magnitude: riskEM = E[ |v˜ |1n ].
These two metrics measure maximum possible/expected absolute
difference that one single private view can make to average scores
respectively.
For further measuring an adversary’s construc-
tive/deconstructive power of view disguise attack by controlling
one private view v˜ , we define the diameter of the output space Dv˜
that an adversary could choose a value from as follows:
• domain diameter: riskDD = maxv˜,v˜ ′∈Dv˜ |v˜ − v˜ ′ |1.
4 LAPLACE MECHANISM
4.1 Design
For numerical values like scored votes, the Laplace mechanism is
the most popular approach to (local) differential privacy. The scale
of the Laplace noises is calibrated to the privacy budget ϵ and the
sensitivity ∆ of the vote as in Algorithm 1. Lemma 4.1 gives exact
bound of the sensitivity ∆ for all positional voting rules, Theorem
4.2 gives formal ϵ-LDP guarantee.
Lemma 4.1. For any positional voting rules with non-increasing
score vector w, the sensitivity of scored votes is:
∆ = max
v,v ′∈Dv
|v −v ′ |1 =
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
|w j −wd−j+1 |.
Proof. Given that every v ∈ Dv is a permutation of the score
vector w, we have ∆ = maxv ∈Dv |w − v |1. Consider any scored
vote v , if there exist two indexes j, j ′ that j < j ′ and vj > vj′ , we
denote −→v the scored vote that swapped and only swapped vj and
vj′ in the scored vote v , then we have:
|w −v |1 − |w − −→v |1
=|w j −vj | + |w j′ −vj′ | − |w j −vj′ | − |w j′ −vj |
=(|w j −vj | − |w j′ −vj |) − (|w j −vj′ | − |w j′ −vj′)|
≤0,
since f (x) = |w j − x | − |w j′ − x | is a non-increasing function for
x ∈ R whenw j > w j′ . By iteratively swapping values that vj > vj′
(j < j ′) in any scored vote v , when −→v is the reverse ofw, we finally
have |w −v |1 ≤ ∑j ∈[1,d ] |w j −wd−j+1 |. □
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 1 satisfies ϵ-LDP .
Proof. Because every vote π is mapped to one scored vote v ∈
Dv , to prove P[M(π ) = t] ≤ exp(ϵ) · P[DM (π ′) = t] holds for any
π and π ′, it’s enough to show Pr[v˜ = t | v] ≤ exp(ϵ) · Pr[v˜ = t | v ′]
holds for any input scored votes v,v ′ and output t ∈ Dv˜ . By defini-
tion of a Laplace random variable Pr[Lap(s) = x] = 12s exp(− |x |s ),
we have:
Pr[v˜ = t | v] = ϵ
d
2d∆d
exp(−ϵ · |t −v |1
∆
),
hence Pr[v˜=t | v]Pr[v˜=t | v] = exp(
ϵ ·( |t−v ′ |1−|t−v |1)
∆ ) ≤ exp(ϵ). □
Algorithm 1 Laplace mechanism
Input: A scored vote v ∈ Dv , privacy budget ϵ and the score
vector w of the voting rule.
Output: An unbiased private view v˜ ∈ Rm that satisfies ϵ-LDP.
1: ▷ Compute sensitivity
2: ∆← ∑j ∈[1,d ] |w j −wd−j+1 |
3: ▷ Randomization by adding Laplace noises
4: for j ← 1 to d do
5: v˜j ← vj + Lap(∆ϵ )
6: end for
7: return v˜ = {v˜1, v˜2, ..., v˜d }
4.2 Usefulness Analyses
The usefulness bound of the average score estimator (refer to Equa-
tion 1) given by Laplace mechanism is analyzed in Theorem 4.3,
proof of which is a simple application of Laplace random variables’
variance formulation.
Theorem 4.3. The mean squared error of average score estimator
given by the Laplace mechanism in Algorithm 1 is:
errMSE =
2d · (∑j ∈[1,d ] |w j −wd−j+1 |)2
nϵ2
.
4.3 Soundness Analyses
Consider the average score estimator θ˜ given by the Laplace mech-
anism, its risks under data amplification attack and view disguise
attack are presented in Theorem 4.4, proof of which is omitted as
being almost trivial.
Theorem 4.4. The risks of Laplace mechanism under adversarial
attacks are:
riskMM = +∞;
riskEM =
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
∆
ϵ
exp(−|w j |ϵ
∆
) + |w j |;
riskDD = +∞.
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These bounds show that the maximum possible risk of the
Laplace mechanism is infinite and the expected risk grow linearly
with 1ϵ . Consequently, imposing a stringent level of privacy harms
soundness of the voting result. One possible solution to restrict the
unlimited maximum possible risk is filtering out private views that
are extreme unlikely observed. For example, we may define the
allowable output area (with threshold probability β) as:
D˜p = {v˜ | v˜ ∈ Rm , Pr[v˜ |v] ≥ β for some v ∈ Dv }.
For Laplace mechanism, it is equivalent to:
{v˜ | v˜ ∈ Rd , |v˜−v | ≤ ∆(log(1/β) + d log(∆/ϵ))
ϵ
for somev ∈ Dv }.
As a result, even if we can filter out outliers of private views, the
diameter or volume of the allowable output area, which determines
maximum possible risks, also grows with 1ϵ .
5 WEIGHTED SAMPLING MECHANISM
5.1 Design
Another common technique achieving ϵ-LDP for numerical vectors
is selecting one (data-dependent) option according to its correspond-
ing value (e.g., for set-valued data [58], for probabilistic data [44]),
and then sanitizing the selected option. This paradigm transforms
the numerical ϵ-LDP problem to well-studied categorical one.
The naive sampling strategy for a scored vote v would be sam-
pling the candidate j with a probability of |vj ||v |1 as in [44, 58]. In-
tuitively, the sampling probability should not be related to the
absolute magnitude of vj , since adding a constant value to the vec-
tor should not change sampling probabilities. Hence we propose a
general and flexible weighted sampling strategy with an intercept
value c in Algorithm 2. The state-of-the-art binary randomized
response mechanism [20, 41] is used as the base randomizer for
later ϵ-LDP protection on the selected categorical candidate. The
weighed sampling masses m = {m1,m2, ...,md } are the vector of
sampling probabilities for each rank, we assume mj ≥ 0.0 and∑
j ∈[1,d ]mj = 1.0.
Formal ϵ-LDP guarantee of the algorithm is presented in Theo-
rem 5.1, unbiasedness of the private view v˜ to the scored vote v is
described in Lemma 5.2 (see Appendix 10.1 for proof).
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 2 satisfies ϵ-LDP .
Proof. Note that the probabilistic rank selection sub-process at
line 1 to 7 in Algorithm 2 uses no information of π , hence consumes
no privacy budget. The only step directly uses information of π is
at line 10, which maps the rank j∗ to an index πj∗ of candidates,
thus in order to prove the final private view satisfies ϵ-LDP, it’s
enough to show that for any πj∗ ,π ′j∗ ∈ [1,d], the corresponding
probabilities Pr [v˜ = t] have up to exp(ϵ) discrepancy.
Another observation is that v˜ is derived from the vector B˜ with-
out directly using information about π , hence we only need to
prove resulting vectors B˜ is ϵ-LDP for any πj∗ ,π ′j∗ ∈ [1,d]. Follow
Algorithm 2Weighted sampling mechanism
Input: A vote π , privacy budget ϵ , score vector w of the voting
rule and weighed sampling masses m.
Output: An unbiased private view v˜ ∈ Rd that satisfies ϵ-LDP.
1: ▷ Select one rank
2: r ← Uni f ormRandom(0.0, 1.0)
3: j∗ ← 0
4: while r ≥ 0.0 do
5: j∗ ← j∗ + 1
6: r ← r −mj∗
7: end while
8: ▷ Randomization by binary randomized response
9: B ← {0}d
10: Bπj∗ ← 1
11: for j ← 1 to d do
12: r ← Uni f ormRandom(0.0, 1.0)
13: if r < 1√
exp(ϵ )+1 then
14: B˜j ← 1 − Bj
15: end if
16: end for
17: ▷ Derive unbiased scores
18: for j ← 1 to d do
19: v˜j ← (
√
exp(ϵ )+1)·B˜j−1√
exp(ϵ )−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ + c
20: end for
21: return v˜ = {v˜1, v˜2, ..., v˜d }
the proof sketch in [31], we have:
Pr[B˜ = T |πj∗ ]
Pr[B˜ = T |π ′j∗ ]
=
√
exp(ϵ · [Tπj∗ = 1] + ϵ · [Tπ ′j∗ = 0])√
exp(ϵ · [Tπj∗ = 0] + ϵ · [Tπ ′j∗ = 1])
≤
√
exp(ϵ · 2)√
exp(ϵ · 0)
≤ exp(ϵ ).
□
Lemma 5.2. The private view v˜ given by Algorithm 2 is an unbiased
estimation of the scored vote v .
5.2 Usefulness Analyses
The accuracy/usefulness of the weighted sampling mechanism de-
pends on the choice of its parameters, including the design of the
sampling massesm and the intercept value c . Lemma 5.3 formulates
the score estimator’s error bounds as a function of these parameters
(see Appendix 10.2 for proof), the error can be decomposed into
two parts, the first part 1n
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(w j−c)2
mj is the variance due to
weighted sampling, the second part 1n
d
√
eϵ
(√eϵ−1)2
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(w j−c)2
mj is
the variance due to binary randomized response. Further in Theo-
rem 5.4, we establish achievable error bounds via choosing optimal
sampling and interception parameters.
Compared to error bounds of Laplace mechanism in Theorem 4.3,
when privacy budget is low (e.g., when eϵ ≈ ϵ+1), the factor related
to the score vector of a voting rule is improved from (∑j ∈[1,d ] |w j −
wd−j+1 |)2 to 2(
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |w j−w ⌈ d2 ⌉ |)
2. For the simplicity of notation,
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Figure 2: Theoretical mean squared estimation error of
Laplace, weighted sampling and additive mechanism with
Borda, Nauru, plurality and anti-plurality voting rules over
5 candidates.
we define:
Ωw =
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
|w j −w ⌈ d2 ⌉ |.
Lemma 5.3. The mean squared error of average score estimator
given by the Laplace mechanism in Algorithm 2 with sampling masses
m and intercept value c is:
errMSE =
1
n
(1 + d
√
eϵ
(√eϵ − 1)2
)
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(w j − c)2
mj
.
Theorem 5.4. The mean squared error of average score estimator
given by the Laplace mechanism in Algorithm 2 is bounded as follows:
min
m∈⊮,c ∈R errMSE ≤
1
n
(1 + d
√
eϵ
(√eϵ − 1)2
) · (
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
|w j −w ⌈ d2 ⌉ |)
2,
corresponding sampling masses m∗ =
[ |w1−c∗ |∑
|m∗−c∗ |
,
|w2−c∗ |∑
|m∗−c∗ |
, ...,
|wd−c∗ |∑
|m∗−c∗ |
], where the normalization fac-
tor
∑
|m∗−c∗ | is
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |w j − c∗ |, and the intercept value c∗ is
median(w) orw ⌈ d2 ⌉ orw ⌊ d2 ⌋+1.
Proof. The proof follows two steps, the first step (in Lemma 5.3)
writes the mean squared error as a function of sampling masses m
and the intercept value c , the second step finds optimal parameters
by solving following equivalent problem:
min
m,c
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(w j − c)2
mj
.
s .t . mj ≥ 0.0 for j ∈ [1,d]∑
j ∈[1,d ]
mj = 1.
When fixing the variable c , the sub-problem
minm
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(w j−c)2
mj has closed-form solution of mj =
|w j−c |∑
j∈[1,d ] |w j−c) | . Consequently the optimizing problem becomes:
min
c
(
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
|w j − c |)2,
which is minimized when c is the median value of the vector w or
w ⌈ d2 ⌉ orw ⌊ d2 ⌋+1. Substitute the optimal parameters ofm and c into
the formula in Lemma 5.3, we have:
errMSE ≤ 1
n
(1 + d
√
eϵ
(√eϵ − 1)2
) · (
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
|w j −median(w)|)2.
□
5.3 Soundness Analyses
Consider a private view v˜ from the weighted sampling mechanism,
its risks to the voting result are presented in Lemma 10.1 (see Ap-
pendix 10.3 for proof). Specifically, with parameters for optimal
usefulness (see the former subsection), risk bounds of weighted sam-
pling mechanism are presented in Theorem 5.5. Comparing to the
Laplace mechanism, the maximum difference risk and the domain
diameter risk are shrunk from +∞ to limited values that grow with√
exp(ϵ )√
exp(ϵ )−1 . Numerical comparison on expected magnitude risks of
the Laplace mechanism and weighted sampling mechanism for
Borda voting are presented in Figure 3.
Theorem 5.5. The manipulation risks of weighted sampling mech-
anism with intercept value c = ⌈d2 ⌉ and sampling masses m =
{ |w1−c |Ωw ,
|w2−c |
Ωw
, ...,
|wd−c |
Ωw
} are:
riskMM =
d
n
max[ | −
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |, |
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |];
riskEM =
∑
j∈[1,d ]
mj[w j > c] (
√
eϵ + d − 1)t ′+ + (
√
eϵ (d − 1) + 1)f ′+
n · (√eϵ + 1)
+
∑
j∈[1,d ]
mj[w j < c] (
√
eϵ + d − 1)t ′− + (
√
eϵ (d − 1) + 1)f ′−
n · (√eϵ + 1)
;
riskDD =
2
√
eϵd√
eϵ − 1
Ωw .
Where the t ′+ and t ′− denote |
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1Ωw + c | and | −
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1Ωw + c |
respectively, the f ′+ and f ′− denote | −1√eϵ−1Ωw+c | and |
1√
eϵ−1Ωw+c |
respectively.
6 ADDITIVE MECHANISM
The usefulness/soundness performance of the Laplace mechanism
and the weighted sampling mechanism largely depend on the
∆w =
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |w j − wd−j+1 | and Ωw =
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |wj − w ⌈ d2 ⌉ |.
Whenw ⌈ d2 ⌉ is relatively close towd (e.g., in k-Approval voting and
Reciprocal voting), the difference between Ωw and ∆w will be in-
significant. As opposed to the sampling then randomized response
paradigm in the weighted sampling mechanism, here we propose
an end-to-end approach: the additive mechanism.
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6.1 Design
Let Ck = {S | S ⊆ C and |S | = k} denote the set of candidate subsets
that have size of k , let wkmax =
∑
j ∈[1,k ]w j denote the maximum
total weights of one subset, let wkmin =
∑
j ∈[[d−k+1,d ]]w j denote
the minimum total weights of one subset, the additive mechanism
is presented in Definition 6.1.
By its name, the additive mechanism randomly responses with a
subset of candidates S with a probability linear to their total scores∑
Cj′ ∈S vj′ . The mechanism is a novel mutant of the popular expo-
nential mechanism for achieving differential privacy, which usually
responses with a probability proportional to the exponential of
candidates’ scores. In additive mechanism, the probability is pro-
portional to the additive summary of candidates’ scores, which is
designed for deriving an unbiased estimation of average scores.
Definition 6.1 (Additive Mechanism). In a ϵ-LDP positional voting
system, where the candidate is C and the scored vector is w, take a
scored vote v as input, the additive mechanism randomly outputs
an S ∈ Ck according to following probability design:
Pr[S|v] =
∑
Cj′ ∈S vj′ −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· exp(ϵ) − 1
Φ
+
1
Φ
,
where the normalizer is Φ =
(d
k
) k
n (eϵ−1)
∑
j∈[1,d ]w j−eϵwkmin+wkmax
wkmax−wkmin
.
The estimator of the scored vote v is (j ∈ [1,d]):
v˜j = ak · [Cj ∈ S] − bk ,
whereak = [
∑
j′∈[1,d ]w j′(eϵ−1)− dk eϵwkmin+ dkwkmax ] d−1(d−k )(eϵ−1) ,
and bk = [ (k−1)(e
ϵ−1)
d−1
∑
j′∈[1,d ]w j′ − eϵwkmin +wkmax ] d−1(d−k )(eϵ−1)
After giving formal ϵ-LDP guarantee and unbiasedness guaran-
tee of the additive mechanism in Theorem 6.2 (see Appendix 10.5
for proof) and Lemma 6.3 respectively, we turn to consider efficient
implementation of the additive mechanism, a naive sampling ap-
proach would have
(d
k
)
computational costs. Actually, selecting a
subset of size k from d options in additive mechanism is a stricter
case of weighted reservoir sampling [28], where each option is ran-
domly selected with given marginal weights (probabilities), but no
restriction is put on joint probabilities of selected options. We here
present a recursive implementation in Algorithm 3 (see Appendix
10.6), which decomposes subsets in Ck into d −k + 1 groups accord-
ing to the topmost rank of candidates in a subset, then randomly
choose one group and transform to a sub-problem of selecting k − 1
weighted options. The computational complexity of the recursive
algorithm is O(d · k).
Theorem 6.2. The additive mechanism satisfies ϵ-LDP.
Lemma 6.3. The private view v˜ given by additive mechanism is
an unbiased estimation of the scored vote v .
Proof. Consider the probability that an option Cj shows in the
output S when input scored vote is v :∑
S ∈Ck and Cj ∈S
Pr[S |v]
=
(
d − 1
k − 1
)
( vj −w
k
min
wkmax −wkmin
· exp(ϵ) − 1
Φ
+
1
Φ
)
+
∑
j′∈[1,d ] and j′,j
(
d − 2
k − 2
)
( vj
′ −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· e
ϵ − 1
Φ
)
= (
(d−1
k−1
)
vj +
(d−2
k−2
)[(∑j′∈[1,d ]wj′) −vj ] −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· e
ϵ − 1
Φ
+
(d−1
k−1
)
Φ
=
(d−1
k−1
)(d
k
) (d−k )(eϵ−1)d−1 vj + (k−1)(eϵ−1)d−1 ∑j′∈[1,d ]wj′ − eϵwkmin +wkmaxk
d
∑
j′∈[1,d ]wj′(eϵ − 1) − eϵwkmin +wkmax
.
Consequently, vj = ak · E[Cj ∈ S] − bk , where ak =
[∑j′∈[1,d ]wj′(eϵ − 1) − dk eϵwkmin + dkwkmax ] d−1(d−k)(eϵ−1) , and bk =
[ (k−1)(eϵ−1)d−1
∑
j′∈[1,d ]wj′ − eϵwkmin + wkmax ] d−1(d−k )(eϵ−1) . Hence
E[ak · [Cj ∈ S] − bk ] is an unbiased estimation of vj .
□
6.2 Usefulness Analyses
The estimation error bound of the additive mechanism is given
in Theorem 6.4. The formulation of the bound has a dependence
on the score vector of a voting rule. In Borda voting, we have∑
j′∈[1,d ] wˆ j′ = O(d2)when ϵ = O(1), hence the mean squared error
bound is O(d4ϵ 2 ). As a comparison, the mean squared error bounds
of the Laplace mechanism and weighted sampling mechanism are
O(d5ϵ 2 ).
For better illustration, we depict numerical bound of the additive
mechanism for Borda rule in Figure 2, along with a comparison
with the Laplace and weighed sampling mechanism. The numer-
ical results show average 75% error reduction compared to the
Laplace mechanism, and average 40% error reduction compared to
the weighted sampling mechanism.
Theorem 6.4. The mean squared error E[|θ˜ −θ |22] of average score
estimator given by the additive mechanism is bounded as follows:
(∑j′∈[1,d ] wˆ j′)2 −∑j′∈[1,d ] wˆ2j′
n(eϵ − 1)2 ,
where wˆ j = wj (eϵ − 1) − eϵwd +w1.
Proof. The parameter k = 1 is near to optimal for many voting
rules except extremal cases of score vector w (e.g., of plurality vot-
ing). Hence to characterize the usefulness performance of additive
mechanism, we only need to analyze the case when k = 1. Given
that a1 =
∑
j′∈[1,d ]wj′ − e
ϵd
eϵ−1wd +
d
eϵ−1w1, b1 = − e
ϵ
eϵ−1wd +
1
eϵ−1w1, and Pr[Cj ∈ S |v] =
vj (eϵ−1)−eϵwd+w1∑
j′∈[1,d ] wj′ (eϵ−1)−eϵdwd+dw1 . The
variance of Bernoulli variable [Cj ∈ S] is Pr[Cj ∈ S |v](1 − Pr[Cj ∈
S |v]), then the variance of v˜j = a1[Cj ∈ S] − b1 is:
(a1)2Pr[Cj ∈ S |v](1 − Pr[Cj ∈ S |v]).
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Figure 3: Theoretical expected magnitude risks of Laplace,
weighted sampling and additive mechanism with Borda,
Nauru, plurality and anti-plurality rules over 5 candidates.
Consequently, the total variance E[|v˜ − v |22] is
(∑j′∈[1,d ] wˆ j′ )2−∑j′∈[1,d ] wˆ2j′
(eϵ−1)2 . □
6.3 Soundness Analyses
The adversarial risks of additive mechanism are presented in The-
orem 6.5. When applying parameter k = 1 for the Borda rule, we
have a1 = O(dϵ ) and b1 = O(dϵ ), hence the risk bounds of riskMM
and riskEM are both O(d2ϵ ), the risk bound of riskDD is O(dϵ ). As a
comparison, in the weighted sampling mechanism, the risk bounds
of riskMM and riskEM areO(d3ϵ ), the risk bound of riskDD isO(d
3
ϵ ).
Figure 3 presents numerical results of these risks in additive mech-
anism comparing with the Laplace and weighted sampling mech-
anisms. In most cases, additive mechanism reduces 70% expected
magnitude.
Theorem 6.5. The manipulation risks of additive mechanism are:
riskMM =
k |ak − bk | + (d − k)|bk |
n
;
riskEM =
k |ak − bk | + (d − k)|bk |
n
;
riskDD ≤ 2k |ak |.
Proof. For any intermediate result of subset S ∈ Ck , the corre-
sponding private view v˜ = {v˜1, v˜2, ..., v˜d } contains number of k of
ak − bk and number d − k of −bk , hence both riskMM and riskEM
are |ak−bk |+(d−1) |bk |n . Consider riskDD, for any paired intermediate
results S, S ′ ∈ Ck , their corresponding private views differ in at
most 2k positions, the magnitude of each difference is |ak |, hence
the maximum possible total differences are 2k |ak |. □
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Usefulness vs. Indistinguishability
The privacy budget of ϵ-LDP controls distinguishability in proba-
bilistic outputs, thus limits mutual information between the private
view and the scored vote. Vote data, as numerical data with fixed
and exclusive ordinal values, could be treated as numerical data
(e.g., in Laplace mechanism) or categorical data (e.g., in weighted
sampling mechanism), its mean squared error suffers a factor of
θ ( 1ϵ 2 ) when ϵ = O(1), which is the same as numerical data or
categorical data (e.g., lower bounds in [20]). Extra factor in mean
squared error that is determined by the scored vector of a voting
rule and the concrete design of an ϵ-LDP mechanism. As numerical
error bounds in Figure 2 demonstrated, for most voting rules, the
error of weighted sampling mechanism is about 50% of the Laplace
mechanism’s, while the additive mechanism is about 25%.
7.2 Soundness vs. Indistinguishability
Since the probabilistic outputs are almost indistinguishable regard-
less of the value of the manipulated/true vote, a more rigid level of
privacy protection in ϵ-LDP has the advantage of limiting an adver-
sary’s constructive power, hence the resulting scores are less led by
preferences of the manipulated vote. However, when an adversary
could falsely contribute an extra vote to the voting system, a more
rigorous level of privacy means a larger magnitude of the private
view, thus the expected amount of scores an adversary added to the
resulting scores is amplified. As shown in the soundness analyses
of Laplace mechanism and our proposed mechanisms, the expected
magnitude of private view is linear to 1ϵ , the deconstructive power
of every voter (or a possible adversary) gets larger due to the noises
injecting for privacy preservation. A desirable property of the addi-
tive mechanism is that the maximum possible magnitude of private
view equals the expected magnitude, meanwhile the Laplace and
weighted sampling mechanisms don’t hold. In voting systems for
business decision making, a possible counter-measure to the data
amplification attack is broadening survey population, increasing
number of voters decreases the relative magnitude of one possibly
adversarial vote.
Consider the cases of view disguise attack that an adversary di-
rectly sends a fraud private view, the ability/power of the adversary
is closely related to the domain of the private view, from which the
adversary could choose a value to destroy or reform the final result.
The private view’s domain of Laplace mechanism spreads to Rd ,
in the weighted sampling mechanism or the additive mechanism,
the domain is reduced to [−Θ( 1ϵ ),Θ( 1ϵ )]d . These results suggest
that a higher level of privacy preservation empowers higher ability
that an adversary could manipulate the voting result. As counter-
measures, imposing a lower level of privacy protection or bringing
in more voters could strengthen the soundness of a voting system.
Another approach is putting soundness metric into the design of
ϵ-LDP mechanism, for example, risk bounds of the additive mech-
anism are much better than the Laplace and weighted sampling
mechanism’s.
Another interesting aspect of soundness is the difference be-
tween the centralized differential privacy model and the local dif-
ferential privacy model. Centralized differential privacy (of the
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unbounded differential privacy [45] notion) assumes all votes have
been collected by a trustable database curator, and ensures probabil-
ity distribution of the final scores of candidates be almost indistin-
guishable, regardless of whether one single vote is in the database.
Consequently, one fraudulent vote can’t significantly change the
differentially private output in the probabilistic perspective, enforc-
ing a more rigid level of unbounded differential privacy suppresses
adversaries’ fraud power/income, and is helpful for truthfulness
in social welfare maximization [51]. There is also a notion of dif-
ferential privacy defined by almost indistinguishable in outputs
when one single vote changes value, and is termed bounded differ-
ential privacy [45]. The ϵ-unbounded differential privacy implies
2ϵ-bounded differential privacy, but not vice versa. Local differential
privacy is equivalent to the bounded differential privacy defined
on a single vote. The ϵ-LDP, unbounded and bounded differen-
tial privacy all put limitations on an adversary’s data manipulation
power/income, but ϵ-LDP/bounded differential privacy suffers from
data fraud.
Inspired by the difference in soundness performance between
unbounded differential privacy and bounded (or local) differential
privacy, in order to improve soundness against fraudulent votes,
the voting counter may force a probability of discard/opt-out prob-
ability p for every vote, which is similar to data sampling for bud-
get saving in unbounded differential privacy. Consequently, the
expected difference a fraudulent vote can make to the final total
scores is shrunk by a factor of p. However, this can’t change the
expected difference a fraudulent vote can make to final average
scores, such as soundness metrics of riskMM and riskEM , since the
expected number of available voters also shrinks by a factor of p.
7.3 Usefulness vs. Soundness
Recall that the weighted sampling mechanism and additive mech-
anism improve usefulness and soundness metrics simultaneously,
compared to the Laplace mechanism. Here we explore interactions
between these two performance metrics. Consider the soundness
metric of expected magnitude riskEM and the usefulness metric of
mean squared error errMSE , we have:
riskEM ≤
√
d · n · errMSE +∑j ∈[1,d ] |wj |
n
,
which is derived as follows according to convexity of the square
root:
E[|v˜ |1]
n
≤ E[|v˜ −v |1] + |v |1
n
≤
E[
√
d · |v˜ −v |22] +
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |wj |
n
≤
√
d · n · E[|θ˜ − θ |22] +
∑
j ∈[1,d ] |wj |
n
.
This inequality implies that a mechanism with good usefulness
performance usually has good soundness performance too.
In some scenarios that voting administrators pay much atten-
tion to soundness performance, they may put hard constraints on
riskDD . A natural question arises, how do soundness constraints
affect the usefulness of the voting system? Here we give a negative
result that ϵ-LDP mechanism (having unbiased estimator) may not
even exist under these constraints. Based on Popoviciu’s inequality
on variances, we have:
riskDD ≥ 2
√
errMSE
n
.
Given that errMSE goes to infinity as ϵ → 0 when the number of
voters n is fixed, constraints on riskDD become unsatisfied.
8 EXPERIMENTS
We now evaluate the usefulness and soundness performance of
weighted sampling and additive mechanism, and compare them
with the Laplace mechanism [24] and the original sampling-based
approach in [44, 58].
8.1 Settings
Datasets. In order to thoroughly assess performance of mech-
anisms in extensive settings, we use synthetic datasets. In each
vote aggregation simulation, each candidate Cj is assigned with a
uniform random scale α j ∈ [0.0, 1.0). Each voter’s numerical pref-
erence β(i, j) on candidate Cj is an independent uniform random
value r(i, j) ∈ [0.0, 1.0) multiplied by the scale α j ∈ [0.0, 1.0), then
the voter’s ranking on candidates is determined by β(i, j). In these
simulations, the number of candidates d ranges from 4 to 32, the
number of voters n ranges from 1000 to 1 000 000.
Adversarial votes in the simulation of data amplification attack
are uniform-randomly selected from the vote domain Dv . The
number of adversarial votes n′ ranges from n · 0.1% to n · 5.0%.
Adversarial private views in the simulation of view disguise
attack are generated so that the 2nd rank candidate Cj2 (in the
non-adversarial voting result) benefits most. That is, we assume the
adversary has the prior knowledge of 1st and 2nd ranked candidates,
and the adversarial private view v˜ has maximum v˜j2−v˜j1 among the
domain of private view. Specifically for the Laplace mechanism that
the private view’s domain is [−∞,+∞]d , we use 95% confidence
interval of the Laplace distribution as filtered domain, and assign
v˜j2 = log( 11−0.95 )∆ +w1, v˜j1 = − log( 11−0.95 )∆ +wd . The number
of adversarial private views n′′ in simulations ranges from n · 0.1%
to n · 5.0%.
Information about simulation parameters is summarized in Table
3. Our experiments focus on the most popular Borda and Nauru
voting rules. Every experimental result is the average value of 400
repeated simulations.
Table 3: Enumeration of experiment settings, the values in
bold format are the default settings.
Parameter Enumerated values
voting rule Borda, Nauru
number of candidates d 4, 8, 16, 32
normal voters n 1000, 10000, 1000000
adversarial votes n′ n · 0.1%, n · 1.0%, n · 5.0%
adversarial views n′′ n · 0.1%, n · 1.0%, n · 5.0%
privacy budget ϵ 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0
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Evaluation Metrics. We use usefulness metrics in Section 3.4
to evaluate the performance of mechanisms in the non-adversarial
and adversarial settings. Since the mean squared error and the
soundness metrics of mechanisms are theoretically analyzed and
numerically compared in former sections, hence their results are
omitted.
8.2 Non-adversarial Results
Varying number of candidates. Simulated withn = 10000 vot-
ers, the total variation error and accuracy of winner results under
the Borda rule with varying number of candidates are demonstrated
in Figures 4 and 5 respectively (extra results can be found in Appen-
dix 10.8). When compared to the Laplace mechanism, the weighted
sampling mechanism averagely reduces errTVE by 25%, while the
additive mechanism averagely reduces errTVE by 50%. The perfor-
mance discrepancy between the weighted sampling and additive
mechanism grows with the number of candidates, which confirms
our theoretical analyses of mean squared error bounds.
Varying number of voters. Simulated with d = 8 candidates,
experimental results with n = 1000 voters are demonstrated in
Figures 8 and 10, experimental results with n = 100 000 voters are
demonstrated in Figures 9 and 11 (additional results can be found in
Appendix 10.7). Comparing them with results on n = 10000 voters,
it is observed that increasing the number of voters improves the
usefulness performance significantly. The additive mechanism is
also practical when there are relatively few voters (e.g., n = 1000),
and achieve more 80% accuracy when ϵ ≥ 1.0. When the number
of voters is 100 000, all mechanisms achieve nearly 100% accuracy
of winner even when the privacy budget is low (e.g., ϵ < 1.0).
8.3 Data Amplification Attack
Simulated with d = 8 candidates and n = 10000 benign voters,
the total variation error errTVE results under Borda rule with extra
n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes are presented in Figure 6 (and
also in Appendix 10.9). Results show that less than 1% adversarial
votes won’t have effective impacts on the voting result, but more
than 5% adversarial votes will significantly harm the usefulness of
the result. The weighted sampling and the additive mechanisms
outperform the Laplace mechanism in all adversarial settings with
fraudulent votes.
8.4 View Disguise Attack
Simulated with d = 8 candidates and n = 10000 benign voters, the
total variation error errTVE results under Borda rule with extran′′ =
0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views are presented in Figure 7
(and also in Appendix 10.10). Results show that less than 0.1%
adversarial votes won’t have effective impacts on the voting result,
but more than 1% adversarial votes will significantly decrease the
usefulness of the result. The weighted sampling and the additive
mechanisms outperform the Laplace mechanism in all adversarial
settings with disguised private views. Compared with results under
data amplification attacks, the voting result is more sensitive to
view disguise attack.
9 CONCLUSION
Considering adversarial behaviors existing in real-world local pri-
vate data aggregation systems, this work pays attention to both
the usefulness and soundness aspects of privacy preserving mech-
anisms. Adversarial behaviors tailed for the local privacy setting
are classified into data amplification attack and view disguise at-
tack, which are then quantitatively measured by their manipulation
power over the aggregation result. In the context of vote aggrega-
tion, two optimized mechanisms: weighted sampling mechanism
and additive mechanism, are proposed to improve usefulness and
soundness upon the naive Laplace mechanism. Besides theoretical
analyses showing a factor of d (or d2) reduction in estimation error
bounds and manipulation risk bounds for the Borda voting rule,
their performance improvements are further validated by extensive
experiments in both non-adversarial and adversarial scenarios. This
work also discusses subtle relations among usefulness, soundness
and indistinguishability, and calls for further researches solving
dilemmas/conflicts between these fundamental requirements of
practical local private data aggregation systems.
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Figure 4: Total variation error under Borda rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 5: Accuracy of winner under Borda rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 6: Total variation error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes.
0 1 2 3
privacy level ²
(a) n”=0
0
1
2
3
4
5
lo
g(
er
r T
V
E
)
0 1 2 3
privacy level ²
(b) n”=10
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3
privacy level ²
(c) n”=100
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3
privacy level ²
(d) n”=500
0
1
2
3
4
5
Laplace Naive Sampling Weighted Sampling Additive
Figure 7: Total variation error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 8: Total variation error under Borda and Nauru rules
over 8 candidates with 1000 voters.
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Figure 9: Total variation error under Borda and Nauru rules
over 8 candidates with 100000 voters.
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Figure 10: Accuracy of winner under Borda and Nauru rules
over 8 candidates with 1000 voters.
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Figure 11: Accuracy of winner under Borda and Nauru rules
over 8 candidates with 100000 voters.
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10 APPENDICES
10.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. We first prove that the numerical vector (
√
exp(ϵ )+1)·B˜−1√
exp(ϵ )−1
is an unbiased estimation of the binary vector B. Considering an
element B˜j in B˜, we have:
E[ (
√
exp(ϵ) + 1) · B˜j − 1√
exp(ϵ) − 1
]
=
√
exp(ϵ)√
exp(ϵ) + 1
· (
√
exp(ϵ) + 1) · Bj − 1√
exp(ϵ) − 1
+
+
1√
exp(ϵ) + 1
· −(
√
exp(ϵ) + 1) · Bj +
√
exp(ϵ)√
exp(ϵ) − 1
=
(√exp(ϵ) − 1) · (√exp(ϵ) + 1) · Bj
(√exp(ϵ) + 1) · (√exp(ϵ) − 1)
=Bj .
(2)
Next, we want to prove that the vector B · wj∗−cmj +c is an unbiased
estimation of the scored votevj defined by π asvπj = wj . Denote a
vector B having only the j∗-th bit being 1 as B[j∗], by the definition
of the vector B at line 9 and 10, we have:∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
wj∗ · B[πj∗ ] =
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
vπj∗ · B[πj∗ ] = v .
Consequently, we have:
E[B · wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c]
=
∑
j∗=[1,d ]
mj∗ · (B[πj∗ ] ·
wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c)
=(
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
wj∗ · B[πj∗ ]) − (
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
B[πj∗ ] · c) + c
=v − c + c = v .
(3)
Combining unbiasedness results of the randomized response sub-
procedures in Equation 2 and the weighted sampling sub-procedure
in Equation 2, we conclude that the v˜j at line 19 is an unbiased
estimation of vj . □
10.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof. According to the score estimator’s definition in Equation
1 and the independence of each v˜ and the unbiasedness of v˜ in
Lemma 3, we have:
E[|θ˜ − θ |22] = E[|
1
n
∑
i ∈[1,n]
v˜(i) − 1
n
∑
i ∈[1,n]
v(i) |22]
=
1
n2
∑
i ∈[1,n]
E[|v˜(i) −v(i) |22] =
1
n2
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
E[(v˜πj )2] − (vπj )2.
(4)
Consider the score estimator v˜πj of the j-th rank candidate Cπj
in a vote π , according to sampling strategy, the binary value Bπj has
probabilitymj of being 1 (which happens when j∗ == j) and has
probability 1−mj of being 0. Further according to the rule of binary
randomized response onBπj , the randomized bit Bˆπj has probability
√
exp(ϵ )√
exp(ϵ )+1 of being 1 when j
∗ == j and has probability 1√
exp(ϵ )+1
of being 1 when j∗ , j. Separately considering the random rank j∗,
we have
E[(v˜πj )2]
=
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
mj∗ ( [j
∗ = j]√eϵ√
eϵ + 1
+
[j∗ , j]√
eϵ + 1
)(
√
eϵ√
eϵ − 1
· wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c)2
+
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
mj∗ ( [j
∗ = j]√
eϵ + 1
+
[j∗ , j]√eϵ√
eϵ + 1
)( −1√
eϵ − 1
· wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c)2,
summarizing over j ∈ [1,d], we then have:∑
j ∈[1,d ]
E[(v˜πj )2]
=
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
mj∗
√
eϵ + d − 1√
eϵ + 1
(
√
eϵ√
eϵ − 1
· wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c)2
+
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
mj∗
1 + (d − 1)√eϵ√
eϵ + 1
( −1√
eϵ − 1
· wj∗ − c
mj∗
+ c)2
=
eϵ + d · √eϵ − 2 · √eϵ + 1
(√eϵ − 1)2
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
(wj∗ − c)2
mj∗
+
∑
j∗∈[1,d ]
w2j∗ .
(5)
Combining results of Equation 5 and Equation 4, we have:
E[|θ˜ − θ |22] =
1
n
(1 + d
√
eϵ
(√eϵ − 1)2
)
∑
j ∈[1,d ]
(wj − c)2
mj
. (6)
□
10.3 Lemma 10.1 on risk bounds of weighted
sampling mechanism
Lemma 10.1. The manipulation risks of weighted sampling mech-
anism with sampling masses m and intercept constant c are:
riskMM =
d
n
max
j∈[1,d ]
max[ | −1√
eϵ − 1
w j − c
mj
+ c |, |
√
eϵ√
eϵ − 1
w j − c
mj
+ c |];
riskEM =
∑
j∈[1,d ]mj[(
√
eϵ + d − 1)tj + (
√
eϵ (d − 1) + 1)fj ]
n · (√eϵ + 1)
;
riskDD = d ( max
j∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
дj∗, Bˆj − minj∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
дj∗, Bˆj ).
Where tj denotes |
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c |, fj denotes | −1√eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c |
and дj∗, Bˆj denotes
[Bˆj=1]
√
eϵ−[Bˆj=0]√
eϵ−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ .
Proof. The proof contains three parts, each part deals with one
of the risks in the theorem.
Part 1 on riskMM : Recall that the maximum is taken over all
possible j∗ ∈ [1,d] and Bˆ ∈ [0, 1]d . For a given rank j∗, apparently
the maximum is achieved when Bˆ is either [0]d or [1]d , hence we
have the result. Additionally, when the intercept value c is no less
than 0, the results can be trimmed to dn maxj ∈[1,d ] |
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1
w j−c
mj + c |.
Part 2 on riskEM : Consider the conditional expection E[ |v˜ |1n |j∗]
given rank j∗, by the randomization subprocedure of binary ran-
domized response, the randomized vector Bˆ = [0, 1]d expectedly
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has
√
eϵ+d−1√
eϵ+1
ones and
√
eϵ (d−1)+1√
eϵ+1
zeros. When Bˆj is 1, one ele-
ment |v˜j | is |
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ + c |; when Bˆj is 0, one element |v˜j | is
| −1√
eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c |. Consequently we have the result.
Part 3 on riskDD : Consider one element j , we have max |v˜j − v˜ ′j |1
as follows:
max | [Bˆj = 1]
√
eϵ − [Bˆj = 0]√
eϵ − 1
·w j∗ − c
mj∗
−
[Bˆ′j = 1]
√
eϵ − [Bˆ′j = 0]√
eϵ − 1
·w j+ − c
mj+
|,
for any j∗, j+ ∈ [1,d], Bˆj , Bˆ′j ∈ [0, 1]. Due to symmetry, the for-
mer formula is equivalent to:maxj∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
[Bˆj=1]
√
eϵ−[Bˆj=0]√
eϵ−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ −minj∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
[Bˆj=1]
√
eϵ−[Bˆj=0]√
eϵ−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ , hencewe have
the result. □
10.4 Proof of Theorem 5.5
Proof. The proof contains three parts, each part deals with one
of the risks in the theorem.
Part 1 on riskMM : With the given sampling masses m and inter-
ception value c , we can derive that w j−cmj is either Ωw, −Ωw or 0,
then we have the riskMM as follows:
d
n
max[ | −
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |, |
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |, | Ωw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |, | −Ωw√
eϵ − 1
+ c |].
Since
√
eϵ > 1, hence max[| −
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ−1 + c |, |
√
eϵΩw√
eϵ−1 + c |] is no less
thanmax[| Ωw√
eϵ−1 + c |, |
−Ωw√
eϵ−1 + c |], consequently we have the final
results.
Part 2 on riskEM : Whenw j > c , the |
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c | equals to
t ′+, and the | −1√eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c | equals to the f ′+; Whenw j < c , the
|
√
eϵ√
eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c | equals to t ′−, and the | −1√eϵ−1 ·
w j−c
mj + c | equals
to f ′−. Consequently we have the final results.
Part 3 on riskDD : Recall that дj∗, Bˆj =
[Bˆj=1]
√
eϵ−[Bˆj=0]√
eϵ−1 ·
w j∗−c
mj∗ ,
where w j−cmj is either Ωw, −Ωw or 0. When Ωw > 0, the value of
w j−c
mj enumerates [Ωw,−Ωw], further because
√
eϵ > 1, we have:
max
j∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
дj∗, Bˆj =
√
eϵ√
eϵ − 1
Ωw;
min
j∗∈[1,d ], Bˆj ∈[0,1]
дj∗, Bˆj = −
√
eϵ√
eϵ − 1
Ωw.
Consequently we have the final results. □
10.5 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. Since v˜ is mapped from S , to prove the private view v˜
satisfies ϵ-LDP, it’s enough to show that the intermediate view S
satisfies ϵ-LDP.
Firstly we need to prove Pr[S |v] is a valid probability distribu-
tion, that is Pr[S |v] ≥ 0.0 and ∑S ∈Ck Pr[S |v] = 1.0 hold for any
input vDv . Since ∑Cj′ ∈S vj′ ≥ wkmin , we have Φ > 0 and hence
Pr[S |v] ≥ 0.0. Now consider ∑S ∈Ck Pr[S |v], we have:
(d
k
)
Φ
+
∑
S ∈Ck
∑
Cj′ ∈S
vj′ −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· exp(ϵ) − 1
Φ
=
(d
k
)
Φ
+
(
d − 1
k − 1
) ∑
Cj′ ∈C
vj′ −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· exp(ϵ) − 1
Φ
=
(d
k
)
Φ
+
(
d − 1
k − 1
) ∑
j ∈[1,d ]w j −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· exp(ϵ) − 1
Φ
=
1
Φ
(
d
k
)
· (
k
d
∑
j ∈[1,d ]wj −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· (eϵ − 1) + 1) = 1.
Secondly for any paired inputsv,v ′ ∈ Dv and any output values
S ∈ Ck , we have:
Pr[S |v]
Pr[S |v ′] ≤
maxS ∈Ck Pr[S |v]
minS ∈Ck Pr[S |v ′]
≤ (w
k
max −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· e
ϵ − 1
Φ
+
1
Φ
)/(w
k
min −wkmin
wkmax −wkmin
· e
ϵ − 1
Φ
+
1
Φ
)
≤ exp(ϵ).
□
10.6 Algorithm of additive mechanism
The algorithm implementation 3 for additive mechanism (in Def-
inition 6.1) contains a core procedure: additive_select , which re-
cursively select a top ranking position j∗ from remaining positions
[1,d] (see Algorithm 4). The relative weights zj in the algorithm
are proportional to the probability that the candidate Cj will show
in the private view S .
Algorithm 3 Additive mechanism
Input: A vote π , privacy budget ϵ ,voting rule’s score vectorw and
parameter k .
Output: An unbiased private view v˜ ∈ Rd that satisfies ϵ-LDP.
1: ▷ Select k ranking positions
2: for j ∈ [1,d] do
3: ▷ Compute weights of presence for a ranking position
4: zj ← w j−w
k
min/k
wkmax−wkmin
· (eϵ − 1) + 1k
5: end for
6: T ← additive_select(d,k, z)
7: ▷ Deriving unbiased estimator
8: S ← {πj | j ∈ T }
9: for j ∈ [1,d] do
10: v˜j ← [Cj ∈ S] · ak − bk
11: end for
12: return v˜ = {v˜1, v˜2, ..., v˜d }
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Algorithm 4 additive_select(d,k,w)
Input: The number of positions d , parameter k , and positions’
weights z.
Output: k ranking positions T ⊆ [1,d].
1: ▷ Compute probabilities of pj = Pr[min(T ) = j]
2: for j ∈ [1,d − k + 1] do
3: pj ←
(d−j
k−1
) · (zj + (∑j′∈[j+1,d ] zj′ − zj )k−1d−j )
4: end for
5: ▷ Select a minimum rank j∗
6: j∗ ← 0
7: while r ≥ 0.0 do
8: j∗ ← j∗ + 1
9: r ← r − pj∗∑
j∈[1,d ] pj∗
10: end while
11: for j ∈ [j∗ + 1,d] do
12: z′j−j∗ = w j +
zj∗
k−1
13: end for
14: ▷ Recursively select k − 1 ranking positions
15: T ′ = additive_select(d − j∗,k − 1, z′)
16: return T = {j∗} ∪ {j + j∗ | j ∈ T ′}
10.7 Additional experimental results of
varying number of voters
Results of maximum absolute error and loss of winner error under
the Borda rule with n = 1000 votes are demonstrated in Figures
12 and 13 respectively. The maximum absolute error and loss of
winner error results under the Borda rule with n = 100000 votes
are demonstrated in Figures 14 and 15 respectively.
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Figure 12: Maximum absolute error under Borda and Nauru
rules over 8 candidates with 1000 voters.
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Figure 13: Loss of winner error under Borda andNauru rules
over 8 candidates with 1000 voters.
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Figure 14: Maximum absolute error under Borda and Nauru
rules over 8 candidates with 100000 voters.
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Figure 15: Loss of winner error under Borda andNauru rules
over 8 candidates with 100000 voters.
10.8 Additional experimental results of
varying number of candidates
Results of maximum absolute error and loss of winner error under
the Borda rule with varying number of candidates are demonstrated
in Figures 16 and 17 respectively. The total variation error, maxi-
mum absolute error, accuracy of winner and loss of winner error
results under the Nauru rule with varying number of candidates
are demonstrated in Figures 18, 19, 20 and 21 respectively.
10.9 Additional experimental results of data
amplification attacks
Results of maximum absolute error, accuracy of winner and loss of
winner error under the Nauru rule with varying number of adver-
sarial votes are demonstrated in Figures 22, 23 and 24 respectively.
The total variation error, maximum absolute error, accuracy of win-
ner and loss of winner error results under the Nauru rule with
varying number of adversarial votes are demonstrated in Figures
25, 26, 27 and 28 respectively.
10.10 Additional experimental results of view
disguise attacks
Results of maximum absolute error, accuracy of winner and loss
of winner error under the Nauru rule with varying number of
adversarial private views are demonstrated in Figures 29,30 and
31 respectively. The total variation error, maximum absolute error,
accuracy of winner and loss of winner error results under the Nauru
rule with varying number of adversarial votes are demonstrated in
Figures 32, 33, 34 and 35 respectively.
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Figure 16: Maximum absolute error under Borda rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 17: Loss of winner error under Borda rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 18: Total variation error under Nauru rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 19: Maximum absolute error under Nauru rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 20: Accuracy of winner under Nauru rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 21: Loss of winner error under Nauru rule over 4, 8, 16, 32 candidates with 10000 voters.
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Figure 22: Maximum absolute error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes
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Figure 23: Accuracy of winner under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes.
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Figure 24: Loss of winner error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes
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Figure 25: Total variation error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes.
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Figure 26: Maximum absolute error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes
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Figure 27: Accuracy of winner under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes.
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Figure 28: Loss of winner error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial votes
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Figure 29: Maximum absolute error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 30: Accuracy of winner under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 31: Loss of winner error under Borda rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 32: Total variation error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 33: Maximum absolute error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 34: Accuracy of winner under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
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Figure 35: Loss of winner error under Nauru rule with 10000 honest voters and n′ = 0, 10, 100, 500 adversarial private views.
